The battalion commander shrugged helplessly when we advised him that five days was a completely inadequate amount of time in which to train his soldiers. “This is all we have—they are needed on the front,” he replied with grim finality. A few days later, on a separate course that we were running for his medics, half of our class disappeared on the second day. “We have had casualties,” was the only explanation we received. Even in units that fall within the Ukrainian special operations command, most soldiers are sent to the front line with very little training. In one such unit, we estimated that just 20 percent had even fired a weapon before heading to combat.
On May 3, the Ukrainian parliament passed a law that allows territorial defense units—the country’s home guard—to be deployed to combat outside their home regions. These units are manned by local volunteers who typically have received very little preparation. We were soon swamped by requests for training courses. In the western Ukrainian city of Lviv, a town hall meeting to explain the new policy to local territorial defense volunteers was disrupted by wives alarmed at the prospect of their part-time soldier husbands deploying to the front.
Each anecdote by itself a data point, but together they tell a story that belies the relentless optimism that has pervaded Ukrainian representation of the war from the outset. After four months of grinding attrition, the Ukrainian army is facing a manpower shortage.
Every day in the current fighting, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said earlier this month, around sixty to one hundred Ukrainian soldiers are killed and another five hundred wounded in combat. A more recent New York Times article puts that figure much higher—at one hundred to two hundred deaths a day. To put that in context, during the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, one of the bloodiest periods of the war, US deaths were roughly two hundred a week—and among a force almost twice the size of the Ukrainian army.
Aside from Zelenskyy’s admission, the Ukrainian government has been largely reticent about releasing casualty figures and Western governments have offered few of their own assessments, but grim reports from the front line indicate that Ukrainian casualties are high—and perhaps in the long term unsustainable. “My friend’s son is in a company with just thirty soldiers left,” down from the 120 personnel typically in a company, one senior Ukrainian officer told me.
Every day last week, while evacuating civilians from areas in the east under bombardment by the Russians, as we drove to the front we passed a succession of ambulances going the other way. As they passed, my interpreter read aloud the signs displayed on their front bumpers: “three times 300s” or “four times 200s,” using the Ukrainian military terms for wounded and dead. By the end of the week, the figures in their aggregate, for just one section of the front we observed, seemed staggeringly high.
Of course, the Russians continue to take even higher casualties, but with their vastly greater pool of manpower, it is unlikely that these losses will have a significant impact—at least not in the short term.
And as news of the war slides from prominence in the news cycle, the way it is being fought has changed significantly. Ukraine’s troops now face a Russian force that has shifted strategy from the hasty, single-axis attacks that characterized the early weeks of the war. Now there are no more attempts at pincer movements but instead slow but inexorable advances, preceded by massive artillery bombardments—a few kilometers every day all along the front from Izyum in the north to Zaporizhzhia in the south, tightening the noose on a fragile Ukrainian salient protecting the road network that links Kyiv to the east.
In between artillery barrages, the Russians probe Ukrainian lines with small packets of armored vehicles accompanied by infantry and supported by vehicle-mounted heavy machine guns. All the while, artillery shells are launched at regular intervals in the general direction of Ukrainian forces and along their supply routes, a technique known in the US military as harassment and interdiction fire. The Russians are also practicing movement to contact—a form of reconnaissance in which the idea is to identify Ukrainian positions by drawing fire, thus enabling Russian artillery to pound new targets with precision.
The Russian army now occupies an area comprising one-fifth of Ukraine’s total land mass—far more than it did at the outset of the war. President Vladimir Putin’s overall objective remains opaque. The low threshold for declaring victory is likely to be annexation of the entire Donbas region, a goal that Putin has almost accomplished, but with a recent resurgence in Russian confidence, that may not be enough to satisfy him.
Credible reports from Meduza, a Russian-language news site based in Latvia, indicate that Kyiv is back in the crosshairs and that there is now renewed support within the Kremlin for another onslaught on the capital. And there are reports of renewed military activity on the Russian side of the border to the north, the most likely origin of an assault on the capital. Our contacts with the Ukrainian military intelligence directorate tell us that Russian reconnaissance troops and private military contractors have been spotted on the Ukrainian side of the border. These may be indications of another attack on the capital, but a ground attack still appears unlikely. Taking Kyiv would involve a massive effort—probably more resources than Russia has at hand without resorting to general mobilization. But Putin has other options.
An advance to within artillery range would be sufficient to inflict severe punishment on the city, especially if combined with a determined effort to undermine Kyiv’s air defense system. “I have advised my wife that it is not safe to return to Kyiv,” one senior officer told me the other day. While those in the know are worried about this prospect, it’s hard to see any reflection of concern in the city itself. Every day, packed trains and buses return more of the population to their homes, and the capital is again a bustling city, with no resemblance to the ghost town it became in the early days of the war. Sirens still wail throughout the day but are universally ignored. Ironically, the impressive performance to date by Ukraine’s air defense system may have lulled the population into a false sense of security. But every air defense system, no matter how modern, is susceptible to a determined and well-planned effort to penetrate it, and Ukraine’s outdated S-300 is no exception.
Some might say that this commentary paints an overly gloomy picture for Ukraine—that game-changing weapons are on their way, and these will be enough to turn the tide. It is true that the US-made High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), already operating in Ukraine, is a formidable weapon and a welcome improvement on the Ukrainians’ over-used Soviet howitzers and even the recently supplied M777 lightweight 155-millimeter howitzer, whose deficiencies I have written about recently. Even lacking the long-range Army Tactical Missile System, HIMARS can bring accurate fires to bear at ranges exceeding forty miles within minutes of receiving data.
It will be weeks, however, before HIMARS is fielded in sufficient quantity to have a significant effect—maybe too late to reverse the Russian advance. The logistical exigencies of getting more into theater and then bringing Ukrainian artillery personnel to Germany or Poland for training stand in the way. Meanwhile the hemorrhage of casualties continues. And even when fielded, the HIMARS will not have the same effect for the Ukrainians as when employed by the US military, because of a shortfall in Ukrainian task organization. The tactical units we trained lacked forward observers, personnel trained to locate and report targets in a manner that can be rapidly transferred into firing data. The extremely centralized execution of artillery fire in the Ukrainian army makes for some effective fires for effect, such as the recent one that struck several Russian generals, but is not very responsive to the needs of frontline units.
The lack of forward observers may put the Ukrainians at a significant disadvantage, but the Ukrainians have on their side a strong affinity for drones and an intuitive understanding of their value in modern war. I have written previously of the requirement for long-range strike drones, loitering munitions with longer range and heavier payload than the Switchblade, and drones that can be used to deliver logistics. If Washington does provide strike drones, such as the MQ-1 Predator or even its longer-range successor, the MQ-9 Reaper, these platforms will doubtless come with the proviso that they must not be used to strike targets in Russia itself. Since launching such strikes is undoubtedly part of their plan, the Ukrainian military will have to look elsewhere for platforms that can be used for cross-border strikes on Russian reinforcements, supply chains, and infrastructure.
If senior Ukrainian officers are to be believed, the war will not end with a ceasefire while Russian boots are on Ukrainian soil. They are determined not only to remove Putin’s gains since the beginning of the war in February, but also to recover areas of the Donbas that have been under de facto Russian control since 2014. Crimea, some Ukrainians admit, may prove to be a bridge too far, but many are determined that the threshold for Ukrainian victory must also include this region, the annexation of which eight years ago sparked the current period of enmity between the two countries.
The problem lies in squaring the wellspring of Ukrainian resolve with the military’s limited resources. Ukraine needs weapon systems that will give it a real edge over its adversary and help staunch the flow of casualties. Without this edge, no amount of determination and courage will be enough to avoid a prolonged war of attrition, and such a contest will favor the side with the greatest numbers. For Ukraine, the darkest days may be yet to come.
Andrew Milburn retired from the Marine Corps as a colonel in 2019 after a thirty-one-year career. His last position in uniform was as deputy commander of Special Operations Command Central, and prior to that, commanding officer of the Marine Raider Regiment and Combined Special Operations Task Force–Iraq. He is the chief executive officer of the Mozart Group, an LLC training and equipping Ukrainian frontline units.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Oles_Navrotskyi, via depositphotos.com
If they can't form, and we can't supply appropriate weapons to, a mobile reserve with air cover sufficient to obtain air dominance over the FEBA for counteroffensives then it will come down to a battle of attrition that the Russians will likely "win" relative to their objectives vs the objectives of Ukraine in ejecting them from the country.
They need a trained armored reserve, not thrown into the fight piecemeal, with organic indirect fires (again, not thrown into the fight piecemeal) and that means they will need tanks and APC/recce vehicles with substantial aircraft (both helicopters and fast movers). They could then use front line units to hold in the center, launch a counter attack at Kherson drawing Russian forces to that sector, then use their mobile reserve to attack from Kharkiv East and Southeast into the Russian rear…cutting their GLOCs and rail supply from Russia. This would destabilize their entire position in the East and allow the Ukrainians to at least roll the Russians back to the coastal areas.
I think this is why Zelenskyy is asking for 500 tanks, other armored vehicles and F-16s. Training them on our equipment to make it effective would take 60 days, at least. I am not sure they have the 2000 men for those tanks nor the pilots for the F-16s.
The follow on to this, if Ukraine was successful, would be the supply of substantial anti-air assets (Patriots etc.) and additional indirect fire systems to keep the Russians from reforming and reengaging along the same invasion routes. Hopefully the Ukrainians would be able to reconstitute their infantry for anti-armor interdiction, as well, with a period of refit and reorganization.
This does kind of place them in a bad spot in taking the Crimea, though, because so many assets and personnel will be tied up in keeping the Russians at bay elsewhere they won't have a lot of assets to keep launch operations to retake Crimea anytime soon.
The answer might be, however, the mobile Harpoon batteries. If they can get close enough, they can make the Sea of Azov and Sevastopol no go zones that are useless to the Russians for the Black Fleet – or they risk LOSING significant portions of the Black Sea Fleet if not all of it. If Crimea is useless as a port, then the effort to keep it isn't really militarily worth it – or viable – through Putin may not be in a position politically to ever let it go.
Time is always on the side of the defender with interior lines of communications and supply.
Interior lines of communication and supplies allows troops to be concentrated faster, it does not generate manpower, arms, and armor, which are the things the Ukrainians need.
## Comment SPAM Protection: Shield Security marked this comment as “Pending Moderation”. Reason: Human SPAM filter found “nufactur” in “comment_content” ## This is not always true, and is not true in this instance. The current frontlines in the Donbas Basin, as well as the Azov Sea section are actually closer to the Russian supply routes than to the Ukrainian routes; material for the Ukrainian war effort is coming almost entirely from the West now, as domestic manufacturing centres have been hit.
Russian command have been wise to keep the battles waging in the far East of Ukraine where this Western material must trickle in over long distances, and is summarily identified and destroyed. This attrition has essentially now cost Ukraine its warfighting capability. The one area where Kiev has a shot of putting up decent resistance is north of Mykolaiv, again due to its relative closeness to NATO's eastern flank.
Don't play defense in a battle
It is pointless to even think about rolling the Russians back until they have first been stopped. They are still making slow but sure forward progress in the Donbas. Holding the line is the first order of business, and that is proving to be hard enough. It should be possible to eventually halt the Russians, but a successful rollback would require massive amounts of weaponry and manpower – far more than anything within the realm of possibility at present.
## Comment SPAM Protection: Shield Security marked this comment as “Pending Moderation”. Reason: Human SPAM filter found “stimate” in “comment_content” ## I agree. So far the Ukrainians are losing ground, and the soon-to-be capture of Ukrainians at Lysychansk is a blow both to Ukrainian morale and manpower. Even if Ukrainian will-to-fight is unaffected the Russians and separatists will be energized by the victory.
I don't know how many Ukrainians were holding Sverodonetsk and Lysychansk, I've seen estimates from 2k-8.5k. For weeks every road in or out of that cauldron has been within 10km of Russian frontlines and artillery, meaning that any Ukrainian soldiers who withdrew from the area probably had to do so unmounted without heavy equipment as light infantry.
Meanwhile, Russian propaganda videos showcase Russian specialforces in the forests around the area, lying in wait to engage withdrawing and potentially disorganized light infantry.
What proportion of Ukrainians have successfully withdrawn, and what proportion will be killed or captured is impossible for me to say, but I imagine we will be getting more and more estimates soon.
In any case, Russia has committed immense resources to this engagement, and still has some 800,000 active military personnel committed to other theatres. If the Ukrainians managed to coalesce and launch a successful counter-offensive (unlikely in my view) what is to stop Russia from doubling the manpower committed to this front?
IMO a bitter peace is better than a just war, and the Ukrainians are unlikely to secure victory on the battlefield.
Initially the Ukranian army was about 260,000 troops. They have been suffering some 1,000 casualties per day (deaths + injuries). That means some 100,000 casualties so far. That would explain Kiev's desperation to conscript lots more men, and even WOMEN, and send them to the front with almost no training. But sending lots of untrained people to the front is the perfect recipe to get them all KILLED. That's not only stupid and reckless, but criminal. The author is witnessing this carnage in real time. But he says NOTHING. The $$$$ must be really good.
Pointless whatifery .. the Ukraine were trained and supplied by Nato since 2012 and have advisers and special forces on the ground … and like Afghanistan they are being crushed.. the Russians have more advanced weaponry in areas than the west and air superiority that will not diminish without all out war with Nato …losing a thousand a day is 30 k a month .. the ukronazi have been in this meat grinder for months .. Russian losses are much smaller and they are fighting the largest land army in Europe with a much smaller force … it will be army coup , zelensky killed or Putin goes after Kiev and destroys it American in Iraq style … more weapons won’t win ukraine anything but death and destruction
I agree with elements of your comment, I don't think funneling more $ into Ukraine will turn this into a win against Russia. However the performance of the Ukrainians and that of the Afghani army are totally incomparable. The former is inflicting heavy losses on an army with superior armor, arms, and aviation gear. The latter instantly crumbled against a foe with worse arms.
The fact that you are using such derogatory Russian propaganda term as "ukronazi" demonstrates that you are not an objective observer. Also, the claim that "…Ukraine were trained and supplied by Nato since 2012…" reveals alack of familiarity with the subject.
Ah, Its good old Moscow Mike the troll from The Enforcer. What a goof.
They need force-multiplying weapons because they are running out of forces. Unless another country commits fighters it’s an unsustainable defense. Zero times anything else is always zero.
All comments to any aspect of the military situation seem to sidestep a single reality for most people in Ukraine who identify as Ukrainian. The people's sense of this war is apparently that their very existence as a people is in the balance. Given that the country continues to fight after over four months when most commentators predicted early if not immediate collapse of any resistance, seems to indicate a "moral" aspect to this contest. It has taken on the character of a people of some 44M fighting to retain their very identity as people. In that case, as horrific as the prospect may be on multiple levels, even for the aggressor, we may be seeing a continuation of hostilities for a yet extended period of time.
To note, the people have been for hundreds of years during the last 500 years not under a Russian led government. However, when they have experienced Russian government it has been such that significant t insurrections occurred with following state policies to Russify the people. For this reason, millions of people are now in the diaspora that has formed in the Americas, Australia, Europe and New Zealand.
Aside from any stark interpretations of the current situation are we clearly seem to be witnessing a "people's" fight to the death to preserve their nation? In which case, what is the moral duty of the larger community of nations to support a nation of 44M in the retaining of their country when attacked in the manner that has occurred?
What is the continuing effect of a people's will with a demographic this large bent on retaining their nation, apparently again at all costs, in the sustained struggle? Certainly in the US case the very establishment of the Republic occurred under similar circumstances. There are other examples.
What in the end will the effect of the "moral" factor in the final determination of this war? From many reports, all current Russian activity with use of indiscriminate force, terror, policies of Russification in occupied areas, if anything may fuel the moral will of the Ukrainian people to fight on. ,
Ukraine has not done a proper census in decades and what numbers we do have likely include millions of people already living in Poland, the rest of the EU or Russia and the now Russian held territories of internationally recognized Ukraine including Crimea. So that 44 million figure you cite upon which to conscript manpower may be off by ten million or more. Kyiv is now on its sixth wave of mobilization whereas Russia so far has avoided general conscription, relying instead on semi-overt mobilization of contracting existing conscripts and extending contracts including for veterans over age 40. As for diasporas, Armenia counted on the strength of its considerable and influential diaspora to help it hold Ngorno Karabkh, but the unrecognized Republic of Artsakh was still ground down by Azerbaijan's superior Russian/Israeli made firepower and NATO member Turkey's drone CISR.
When the author of this piece says Russia's casualties must be worse than Ukraine's he is simply guessing or inserting that comment in order to sugarcoat the painful reality for Kyiv and its supporters in the Administration and Congress.
Some members of Congress like Rep. Adam Kinzinger (R-IL soon to be former congressman) believe that equipping the Ukrainian Air Force with F16s and ground forces with M1 Abrams will turn the tide. In order to reach the Ukrainians hoped for allotment of artillery/MLRS to go back on the offensive after the failures of their very limited counteroffensives around Kharkov and toward Kherson they are going to need basically almost every cannon and MLRS the US European allies can spare and quite probably a good chunk up to one third of the US Army's stocks (RUSI a British think tank that can hardly be accused of softness on Putin or the Kremlin line says Ukraine is using the entire annual American shell production in 2-3 weeks of firing). As for airpower, besides the challenge of turning a UKR AF SU27 or MiG29 pilot into a competent Viper driver in a few months time frame, those donated F16s will have to be based in Poland which would be an act of NATO war on Russian forces in Ukraine in order to avoid getting destroyed on the ground by Russian Kalibr and other cruise missile strikes on their bases in western Ukraine. The combat performance of Saudi Abrams on the KSA border with Yemen or German-made Leo 2 in Turkish operations across northern Syrian borderlands vs an ATGM awash environment leaves much to be desired.
In conclusion, once the reality of crippling Russian gas shortages hits Germany this winter including with industrial brownouts not far from the gates of American bases where Germans may start picketing, I think Washington, London and Warsaw are going to find themselves under pressure from the Berlin, Paris and Rome troika (to say nothing of the Hungarians and Austrians) to accept a ceasefire deal to stop the fighting that preserves as much of Ukraine intact as possible.
The single reality you're pointing out has two major flaws, made on purpose or out of ignorance. The population of Ukraine before the onset of Russian invasion was not 44 millions but closer to 40 millions. Those numbers are in a steady decline since the fall of USSR. The second flaw is stating, that the whole population of Ukraine is fighting to retain their Ukrainian identity. Are you sure this is a valid statement for the Ukrainians who are ethnic Russians or for those whose primary language is Russian? Those people make half of Ukrainian nation. I can't foresee Russia keeping western Ukraine under long term occupation, if they manage to seize it, due to the hostility of population in Western Ukraine toward Russians. Using same reason, it is highly likely that Russians will successfully occupy and keep Ukrainian regions with the population that is sympathetic to them.
"clearly seem to be witnessing a "people's" fight to the death to preserve their nation? In which case, what is the moral duty of the larger community of nations to support a nation of 44M in the retaining of their country when attacked in the manner that has occurred?"
We must stand tall on the moral high ground and fight to the death alongside them, even if it means nuclear winter and the permanent end of civilization. Ok,Ok just kidding.
"Of course, the Russians continue to take even higher casualties, but with their vastly greater pool of manpower"
It's interesting that basically every report that talks about Ukrainian casualties throws this in as a consolation even though they have no data to prove it. The second part is also false. Ukraine had 3 times manpower advantage at the start and are already on their 5th wave of mobilisation
> Of course, the Russians continue to take even higher casualties
I like the way you just threw that in there without any backing for it at all.
Here is the widely circulated and read RUSI piece The Return of Industrial Warfare, which also considers the role of China (after denying that this was taking place in initial intel assessments, the Biden Administration sanctioned multiple Chinese firms this past week) in supplying the Russians with electronics and other key components for Russia's arms industry:
https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/return-industrial-warfare
1. Russia will win, they have millions of troops to use that are in reserve for America's next dumb decision. They have a full fledge ally in China and are receiving support and bolstering their overall strength. 2. Poland will invade western Ukraine and Ukraine will no longer exist. 3. Due to NATO losing all their equipment as cannon fodder they will eventually dissolve. 4. European leaders are already discussing forming a Roman empire from Northern Africa to turkey including France and England, I think they attempt this. 5. Due to american politicians saying things they shouldn't, China will take Taiwan militarily. 6. If america responds China will hypersonic missle their fleet and kill 20k sailors instantly 7. America will nuke China Port 8. We gone To avoid this we need to leave Ukraine and realize american politicians have ruined our position in this world and fucked up bad. We need to fix america from within without getting involved anywhere else
I don't know how people can seriously make the claim that Russia is losing more soldiers than Ukraine. The Ukrainian soldiers have made it clear that they are seriously outgunned as well as out-maned. The Russian guns are newer and shoot farther and more accurately. Ukrainian soldiers have been complaining that for every shot they fire, Russia fires between 10 and 15. Rather than analysis, this sounds like propaganda.
"clearly seem to be witnessing a "people's" fight to the death to preserve their nation? In which case, what is the moral duty of the larger community of nations to support a nation of 44M in the retaining of their country when attacked in the manner that has occurred?"
We must stand tall on the moral high ground and fight to the death alongside them, even if it means nuclear winter and the permanent end of civilization. Ok, Ok kidding.
Trump would have easily negotiated a security architecture with Russia that would have been perfectly acceptable to the American people and we wouldn’t have this mess. Obsessive Russophobes are just hurting the whole world now.
Russia has numbers and a backlog of Soviet era artillery. Longevity could help them. Their current simple tactic of completing saturation of an area with shells and then making gains by losing large numbers of soldiers can go on for a while yet. Ukraine has outperformed all expectations but cannot escape attrition especially in experienced fighters.
Being first in Target acquisition, having a longer range, and having an 'old faithful' ability to consistently hit targets is the key to this theatre.
Open a second front on it's interests in Georgia, it's going that way eventually, Russia will pinch at smaller states before eying up states like Czechoslovakia and Poland based on how this irrational roll of the dice goes for it.
International law has become a very flimsy piece of paper. The big 3 states realise each can push it further than just proxies in this new era.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/scdike/15220521060/
"Of course, the Russians continue to take even higher casualties, but with their vastly greater pool of manpower"
This is a fine example of magical thinking among the Western military leadership; this degree of detachment from reality can only come from abject hubris… How would it make any sense that the Russians are taking 'even higher casualties' given the Russians have air supremacy over the skies of Ukraine, complete supremacy of armament, artillery systems and almost complete freedom on the movement of their supply?
The Russians are able to send hundreds of shells to Ukrainian positions for every one shell the Ukrainians are able to fire- how exactly does that translate to 'even higher casualties' for the Russians? The answer is quite simply that the statement is untrue, and feckless copium. It's embarrasing and pathetic that we can't be honest with ourselves, because if we keep telling ourselves this nonsense that Russia is suffering more than the Ukrainians, then evermore lives of young Ukrainian men are simply wasted to Russian guns. Thrown into a pointless meatgrinder and wasted.
The West and its Allies will not and cannot win wars if it bases its decisions on its own propaganda.
Zelensky will never negotiate as long as we keep providing more weapons. Unfortunately that means more Ukrainians will die before this war reaches its utterly predictable conclusion.
Russia was supposed to overrun Ukraine in 3 days. 1/5th of Ukraine being held is a big deal if you don't subtract the large swath of the country had to abandon outside Kiev. Ukraine has been promised a TON of weaponry and only has actually received a smidgeon of that gear. Time is not on the Russians side assuming the dedicated gear en route is not recalled
No one seems to recognize that both sides in the war have the possibility of winning the war.
The Russians by taking Odesa will create a land-locked Ukraine. Name me a landlocked country with international clout,
The Ukrainians have moral and potential support from sea to shining sea, from the Black Sea to the Baltic. Copying the development of the United States, the Baltic States Poland, Belarus, Moldavia, and potentially others can become part of a Republic, which I call the Republic for the Commonwealth States of the Rus. Democratic leaning sovereignties and a Roman Republican leading United Rus would seem to add a state that can humble Russia.
In 1966 I wrote for Military Review an article on the Russian Elite, showing how the generals and political commissars came to power in 1957 and maintained that power through roughly 1980. The article predicted that MaoTse Tung would appoint Lin Piao as his successor which he did a month post-publication.
This is not a duplicate.
No one is suggesting at the time that both combatants in Ukraine can win the war. '
The Russians are one port away from making Ukraine a land-locked state. This would make Ukraine almost important, Name a world class landlocked state.
The Ukrainians can create a bloc of stronger states from sea to shining sea, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The Baltic States, Poland, and Moldavia are sympathetic and already sovereign states. Like the United States, they can form the Commonwealth States of the Republic of the Rus.
My husband published in 1966 in Military Review an article on the Russian Elite. It showed how the Stalingrad Marshals and political commissars successfully ruled the Soviet Union, which lasted till 1980. The article also predicted that Mao Tse tung would appoint Lin Piao his successor which occurred a month post publication.
The author writes "The extremely centralized execution of artillery fire in the Ukrainian army makes for some effective fires for effect, such as the recent one that struck several Russian generals, but is not very responsive to the needs of frontline units."
Clicking on the link for "recent" takes one to an article published on May 1, 2022, that is about 8 weeks old. How is recent?
The article offers up that “Of course, the Russians continue to take even higher casualties….” Prove it. As noted in the article, the Ukrainians are not trained and they are being killed in droves. How likely can it be that the much diminished, poorly-trained, and I’ll-equipped Ukrainians are inflicting more casualties on the Russians than vice versa.
“ Crimea, . . . the annexation of which eight years ago sparked the current period of enmity between the two countries.” No. What sparked the enmity is the bloody US annexation of Ukraine on February 22, 2014.
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